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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issue on appeal is whether or not the decision of the 
district court judge in over turning the decision of the 
Department of Business Regulations was reasonable or rational. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann., Sec. 61-2-12 (d) (1953 as amended) 
...The appeal shall thereupon be heard in due 
course by said Court, without a jury, which shall 
review the record and make its determination of the 
cause between the parties. If the Court shall find 
that the Commission has regularly pursued its 
authority and has not acted arbitrarily, it shall 
affirm the decision, order, or ruling of the 
commission. 
Utah Code Ann., Sec. 61-2-11 (8) (9) (1953 as amended). 
The Commission...may... suspend, revoke, {or} place 
on probation...any licensee...if the licensee in 
performing or attempting to perform any of the acts 
specified in this chapter is found guilty of: 
(8) Being unworthy or incompetent to act as a 
principal broker, associate broker, or a salesman 
in such a manner as to safeguard the interest of 
the public; 
(9) Failing to voluntary furnish copies of 
all documents to all parties executing the 
documents; 
The Rules and Regulations of the Division of Real Estate 
11.f. Under no circumstances should a broker 
or salesman advertise property at a lower price 
than listed without the written consent of the 
seller. 
11.g. Subjecting seller to liability of 
paying double commissions is prohibited. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nick Topik, a licensed real estate broker filed an appeal 
from the decision of Ken Wahlgreen, an administrative law judge 
for the Department of Business Regulations for the State of Utah. 
The judgment was entered on the 31st day of August, 1984. In his 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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appeal Nick Topik alleged that the administrative law judge and 
the director of the Department of Business Regulations acted 
arbitrarily in suspending his broker's license for a period of 
150 days and placing him on probation for a period of three 
years* Judge Omer J. Call over turned the decision of the Utah 
Real Estate Commission. 
The hearing before the administrative judge related to 
nine separate fact situations. At the hearing these fact 
situations were treated separately with all the testimony 
relating to each fact situation being given at one time. 
Consequently the record in this matter is segmented into nine 
fact situations. There is one transcending issue that related to 
almost all of the fact situations for which Topik was found in 
violation. The petition of the Department of Real Estate alleged 
in each fact situation that Mr. Topik violated a specific 
regulation or section of the code wherein a rule or regulation is 
clearly set forth. However, in addition to alleging those 
specific acts, the Department also alleged in each fact situation 
that Topik violated U.C.A., Section 61-2-11 (8). That section 
states "...being unworthy of incompetent to act as a principle 
broker, associate broker, or sales agent in such manner as to 
safeguard the interest of the public;..." U.C.A Section 61-2-11 
Subparagraphs 1 through 7, 9 through 14, and Section 16 and 17 
provide specific acts which are prohibited. Subsection 15 
provides for the commission to adopt rules. Those rules also 
talk about specific acts of conduct; however, this is not true of 
Section 61-2-11 (8). The terms unworthy or incompetent to act as 
2 
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a principle broker are so vague that Topik alleged that the 
section is unconstitutional in nature. At the administrative law 
hearing the administrative judge ruled that the term unworthy was 
unconstitutionally vague, but that incompetent was not 
unconstitutionally vague. The State did not appeal nor argue to 
the District Court the administrative laws judgments as it 
related to the term unworthy. There was no testimony presented 
at the administrative hearing by any real estate agent or by any 
of Nick Topik1s peers that indicated that the alleged violations 
were contrary to the practice within the real estate profession 
and there was not testimony as to what constitutes incompetence 
in the real estate profession. 
*' -J FACT SITUATIuN NO. 1 
The evidence submitted by the State consisted of Exhibits 
1 through 5 and reference to Paragraphs 1f 2, and 3 of the 
pre-trial order. The State did not put on any testimony. The 
defendant, Nick Topik, did testify in his own behalf. All of the 
allegations of the State were found not to be true by the hearing 
examiner with the exception of finding that Topik had violated 
Section 61-2-11 (9) which states "failing to voluntarily furnish 
copies of all documents to all parties executing the documents." 
Topik testified that he did not remember if he had given a copy 
of the real estate listing to his client, but that he concluded 
he must have because the client acknowledged receiving a copy on 
the face of the listing. He also testified that the information 
on the listing in blue ink had been filled out while Topik was 
with the client and that the information in black ink was filled 
3 
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1 
out at a later date based upon information given to him by the 
client. (Transcript (T) page (p) 32 and 38 through 39). The 
exhibit in question is marked as Exhibit No. 4. An examination 
of that document will indicate that the sales price, the date of 
the listing, the expiration of the listing, the exemption of the 
people from Florida from the listing, and all of the information 
on the bottom part of the document are filled out in blue ink. 
The client also signed the listing in blue ink and acknowledged 
receiving a copy of the agreement. The only information that is 
not in blue ink has to do with the mortgage, the monthly 
payments, and other general information that gives a description 
of the property. There was never any allegation that the 
information contained on the listing and the information placed 
with the Multiple Listing Board marked as Exhibit No. 5 was 
inaccurate. 
The hearing examiner in Paragraph 5 of his findings 
related to Fact Situation No. 1 , concluded that the examiner 
found no evidence that responded provided Mrs. Tsosie with n... a 
copy of the complete listing". However, the section Mr. Topik is 
found guilty of violating, Section 61-2-11 (9) merely requires 
that copies of all documents be furnished to the parties. It 
says nothing about copies of completed documents nor does it 
imply that there is anything wrong with filling out a document 
based upon information provided by the client. It should be 
noted that the client, Mrs. Tsosie, in this case did not complain 
to the Commission and no evidence was produced that she was in 
any way unhappy with the services provided by Mr. Topik. 
4 
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Judge Omer J. Call found that the listing party 
acknowledged a receipt of the copy of the document and that none 
of the added information altered the contracts between the 
parties and the broker nor endangered the public. Consequently, 
Judge Call reversed the commissioners .decision on Fact Situation 
No. 1. 
FACT SITUATION NO. 2 
Joe Gonzales listed his property for sale with Wardley 
Corporation on March 28, 1982, and the listing was to expire on 
September 28, 1982. In July of 1982, Gonzales learned that his 
property was being foreclosed by a financial institution and 
called Mr. Tugaw, the agent representing Wardley Corporation, and 
told him that he was terminating his listing because of the 
foreclosure and he was to come and take his sign down. (T.p.51) 
Mr. Tugaw did not "indicate to Gonzales whether the property would 
be taken off the listing or not and in fact did not make any 
response to Mr. Gonzales1 instructions. (T.p.55) Thereafter, 
Mr. Gonzales contacted Mr. Topik for the purpose of renting a 
piece of property at which time Mr. Topik offered to assist him 
in selling his house before it was foreclosed. At that time, 
Gonzales informed Topik that he had instructed Wardley to remove 
their sign and to terminate the listing and Gonzales did sign a 
listing with Topik. Ultimately, the property was foreclosed and 
neither real estate agent sold the property. (T.p.52) Gonzales 
did not file a complaint with the Real Estate Board and to this 
date has not complained about the conduct of Topik, but was in 
fact pleased with his efforts. (T.p.57) The property had 
5 
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previously been listed with Topik and Gonzales had terminated the 
listing with Topik prior to the expiration of the listing by 
calling Topik, and Topik had honored that request of Gonzales. 
(T.p.59 through 60) Topik testified that when he was informed by 
Gonzales that the listing had been terminated, he assumed that 
information was factual* (T.p.61) Topik listed Gonzales1 
property on July 31i 1982. 
Tugaw testified that Topik removed his signs from the 
property on approximately the 5th or 6th of September after 
having received a letter from Tugaw saying that Tugaw maintained 
that Wardley Corporation had a valid listing on the property. 
(T.p.61, 71, Exhibit No. 7) Mr. Topik removed his signs and 
terminated their listing activity as soon as he was informed that 
Wardley had not honored Mr. Gonzales1 instruction to terminate 
their listing. Shortly thereafter the home was foreclosed in 
October of that year. 
It should be noted at this time that the complaint that 
brought this fact situation before the Department of Business 
Regulations was filed by Mr. Tugaw or one of the agents in his 
office and was the subject of a grievance hearing conducted in 
Box Elder. At the time the grievance hearing was conducted, Mr. 
Tugaw was the chairman of the grievance committee and sat on the 
committee that determined that Topik was guilty of this grievance 
and forwarded it to the State for action. (T.p.40 through 41) 
It is obvious that this complaint was instigated by Mr. Tugaw, a 
competitor of Mr. Topik, who used his position as the chairman of 
the grievance committee to further his personal goals even though 
6 
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the rules require that a grievance committee consist of impartial 
parties. 
The hearing examiner found that Mr. Topik was guilty of 
exposing Gonzales to two real estate commissions in violation of 
Rule 11(g) of the regulations and being incompetent under Section 
61-2-11 (8). The only finding of the administrative judge that 
could be used to support the violations alleged against Topik was 
that he accepted the statement of Mr. Gonzales that he had 
terminated the listing and that he assumed Wardley would honor 
those instructions as Topik had done with an earlier listing on 
the same property. Upon learning that Wardley would not honor 
the instructions to terminate the listing, Topik immediately 
removed his signs. No evidence was presented before the 
administrative law judge as to whether or not Wardley was 
required to terminate his listing upon verbal notification from 
Gonzales and whether Wardley could have claimed a commission if 
Topik had located a buyer for the property. 
Judge Omer J. Call found that the owner of the property 
involved had represented to Topik that he had terminated the 
prior listing and that Topik removed his signs from the property 
immediately upon finding out that the owner had extended the 
listing on the property and made no claim against the owner for a 
fee. 
FACT SITUATION NO. 3 
In this fact situation the administrative hearing judge 
found that Topik violated Rule 11(f) of the Rules and Regulations 
of the Department of Business Regulations in that he advertised 
7 
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property belonging to Stevens at a price lower than listed and 
without the written consent of the seller. Topik accepts the 
findings of fact as set forth in Paragraphs 11, 12, 13v .15, and 
16 of Fact Situation No. 3 and that part of Paragraph 14 that 
refers to the letter dated August 14, 1983. Topik does not agree 
with the conclusion drawn in the bottom of Paragraph 14. Mrs. 
Stevens testified that she verbally authorized Topik to offer the 
property for sale at $60,000.00 with $5,000.00 down. (T.p.99 
through 101) On August 14, 1983, Mrs. Stevens wrote a letter to 
Nick Topik in which she confirmed . that she had authorized the 
sale of her home on the same terms and conditions as the last 
offer when she was in his office in July. (Exhibit C) Mrs. 
Stevens testified that offer waj in fact the $60,000.00 which was 
a written counter offer made by her on July 14, 1983, a copy of 
which is marked as Exhibit E. (T.p. 100 through 101) 
The evidence demonstrates that Mrs. Stevens executed a 
document which was a written counter offer to an earnest money 
agreement on July 14, 1983, wherein she set the price she was 
willing to accept for the home which was $60,000.00 with 
$5,000.00 down. She verbally confirmed that she was willing to 
sell the property for the sum to Mr. Topik. Mr. Topik advertised 
the property at $59,800.00 with $5,000.00 down. The 
advertisement has a typographical error in it which made it 
appear to be with zero down. The hearing examiner specifically 
found that was a typographical error. Mr. Topik stated that he 
intended to pay the difference of $200.00 between the price of 
$59,800.00 and the authorized listing price of $60,000.00 out of 
8 
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his commission. 
FACT SITUATION NO. 4 
Topic agrees with the statement of the fact situation as 
set forth in Paragraphs 17 and 18. The advertisement in question 
is marked as Exhibit 12. The pertinent part of that 
advertisement states as follows: "...for that matter you or any 
one referred by you to whom we sell property will be eligible for 
a $100.00 gift certificate which we suggest you use for home 
improvements." The hearing examiner did not find that Topik had 
violated any section of the State Code or any regulation except 
the one that provides that he was incompetent. It is important 
to note that there are specific rules and regulations that 
pertain to advertisements. Rule 10(d) of the Rules and 
Regulations promulgated by the Department of Business Regulations 
under a section entitled "Enforcement" states "the Division may 
grant any licensee a reasonable amount of time, not exceeding ten 
days, to correct any defect or violation...failure to comply with 
the notice and requirement may be grounds for suspense or 
revocation". Section 61-2-11 (13) states "Failing to correct any 
defect and/or violation of advertising practices, signs, business 
locations, office, or trust account operation within ten days 
after receiving a written notice from the Division of the defect 
or violation;" Section 61-2-11 (7) indicates that it is a 
violation to actually pay valuable consideration to any person. 
The facts were clearly established that Mr. Topik did not 
pay any valuable consideration to any party. It is also clear 
that the Department did not give Mr. Topik any notice to 
9 
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terminate the advertising practices. Consequently, the hearing 
examiner could not find Topik had violated any of the specific 
sections of the regulations or code, but did find that he was 
incompetent even though the Department had not given the notice 
that the regulation and the statute anticipate. The danger of 
having a catch all section is manifested in the hearing 
examiner1s decision concerning this fact situation. Mr. Topik 
did not violate any written rule or regulation and yet because 
the hearing examiner did not like his conduct, he arbitrarily 
decided that Topik was incompetent without giving any 
justification or reason for reaching such a conclusion. The 
hearing examiner then notes that no one was injured by the flyer, 
which of courij is as reference to the fact that no one was paid 
any money pursuant to that advertisement. 
FACT SITUATION NO. 5 
The hearing examiner found in favor of Topik in this 
situation and found that he had not violated any rules or 
regulations. 
FACT SITUATION NO. 6 
Topik accepts the findings of fact as indicated in 
Paragraph 21 of Fact Situation No. 6, but contends that there are 
additional facts not included in that finding which are important 
to the determination of this fact situation. It should be noted 
that the person bringing the complaint concerning Fact Situation 
No. 6 is Mr. Ed Tugaw, the broker for Wardley Corporation. The 
same individual who supposedly sat as the impartial chairman of a 
grievance committee who originally heard all of the fact 
10 
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situations against Mr. Topik and then referred them to the 
Division of Business Regulations to be acted upon. Mr. Tugaw 
filed a complaint saying that Mr. Topik had filled in information 
on an earnest money receipt and offer to purchase which is marked 
as Exhibit 16. The information Topic is supposed to have filled 
in is accurately set forth in Paragraph 21 of Fact Situation No. 
6. The information that is not included in the findings of the 
hearing examiner pertains to the fact that Topik was specifically 
authorized by his client, the Speers, to fill in the information 
complained of. 
Mr. Speers testified that he and his wife authorized Mr. 
Topik to fill in the information on the earnest money receipt an 
offer to purchase and that he was fully informed at all times of 
what the offer contained. He also testified that neither he nor 
his wife at any time had any complaint concerning Mr. Topik's 
handling of the situation and that the property was sold by Mr. 
Topik to their satisfaction. (T.p.151 through 152) Speers also 
testified as follows: nSo specific reference to the language, 
'buyer will apply for a general electric loan, sell it to pay 
three and one-half points, f that was consistent with what you 
wanted?" Answer: "Yes...." (T.p.153) As pointed out by the 
hearing examiner in his findings in Paragraph 21, a counter offer 
was made on Exhibit 16 and was authorized by the Speers in 
writing. Consequently, the Speers authorized Mr. Topik to fill 
in the information and then specifically in writing confirmed 
that authorization when they were presented with a counter offer. 
The hearing examiner found that there was no violation of 
1 1 
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any specific rule or regulation created by State Law or by the 
Department, but then concluded that Topik was incompetent in the 
manner in which he handled the matter, 
FACT SITUATION NO. 7 
The earnest money receipt and offer to purchase which is 
the subject of this fact situation is marked as Exhibit No* 17. 
That exhibit indicates that the total purchase price was 
$38,000.00 with a $50.00 deposit. That, of course, would leave a 
balance of $37t950.00. The complaint is based upon the fact that 
Line 27 of the earnest money receipt, states that the balance was 
"approximately $37,000.00." Topik does not deny that the 
document was filled out by him in the form that it exists in 
Exhibit No. 17. However, this is not a serious breach of any 
rules. It is interesting to note that in the pre-trial order 
prepared by the Attorney General's Office and signed by the 
hearing examiner, Kent Wahlgreen, a similar mistake is made. 
Paragraph 12 of that pre-trial order relates to a fact situation 
involving an Addie Rucker. That paragraph refers to what is 
Exhibit 19. The last sentence of that paragraph states, "This 
arrangement required Topik to come up with approximately 
$8,000.00 at closing." In fact, the document, Exhibit 19, 
requires Nick Topik to pay $33,140.00 at closing, of which 
$25,600.00 was to be loaned by Fred Mane. This leaves a balance 
of $7,540.00 which Topik was required to pay at closing; not 
$8,000.00 as stated by the Attorney General in Paragraph 12. The 
Attorney General's error was further complicated by the fact that 
Mr. Topik was to pay an additional $2,500.00 as a finders fee. 
12 
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Consequently, Topik was required to come up with $9,840.00 at the 
time of closing. It is interesting that the Attorney General's 
Office is seeking to have Topikfs real estate broker's license 
suspended because he said approximately $37,000.00 when it should 
have been $37,950.00 and then in the very document which accuses 
Topik, the State makes a similar mistake. That mistake is then 
overlooked by the administrative law judge who signs the 
pre-trial order. 
Any person who deals with figures and the complicated 
matters that are involved in real estate transactions or legal 
cases can and will make mistakes. It is the position of Topik 
that Exhibit 19 is clearly enforceable in a Court of law. The 
necessary information is co tained within the four corners of the 
documents and a title company or, if necessary, a Court 
interpreting the document would have no difficulty in determining 
the intent of the parties. Under the circumstances, it seems 
entirely inappropriate to discipline Topik and to apply a higher 
standard of care to him than applies to a member of the bar and 
of the judiciary. 
FACT SITUATION NO. 8 
This fact situation was dismissed by the Attorney 
General's Office. 
FACT SITUATION NO. 9 
Topik was accused of violating a number of specific rules 
and regulations in connection with this fact situation. He was 
accused of violating Section 61-2-11 (15) in sharing a finders 
fee; with violating Section 61-2-11 (1), making substantial 
13 
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misrepresentations; with Section 61-2-11 (2), making false 
promises; and with Section 61-2-11 (16) for dishonest dealing. 
The hearing examiner found that Topik had not violated any of 
these regulations. Again in this fact situation Topik was 
charged with the general allegation that he had acted 
incompetently under Section 61-2-11 (8). 
The allegations in the State1s petition which pertain to 
Fact Situation No. 9 and Section 61-2-11 (8) were as follows: 
(1) That he shared a finders fee with a person who is not 
a real estate agent or broker, 
(2) That he entered into a real estate transaction which 
was detrimental to his client1s interest, 
(3) That he altered the terms of an earnest money 
agreement, and 
(4) That he prepared different earnest money agreements. 
The hearing examiner specifically found that he did not 
share a finders fee and that he did not enter into a transaction 
at the expense of his client. The hearing examiner found that 
Topik prepared multiple documents with no indication of which was 
to be binding, that he failed to account for earnest moneys being 
transferred from one document to another, and added additional 
terms (however innocuous) after an earnest money agreement had 
been signed. 
The administrative law judge found that Topik had executed 
multiple documents with no indication of which was to be binding. 
The judge does not make specific reference to which document he 
is referring. It can only be assumed that he is talking abut 
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Exhibits 20 and 21. Both of those documents are an earnest money1 
receipt and offer to purchase involving Kevin and Jill Jeppsen. 
Nick Topik testified that the first document which is dated June 
4, 1983, was executed so that the deal could be tied down. 
(T.p.332) Exhibit 21 is also dated 6/4/83; however, it has 
additional terms added to it and is signed by both Kevin Jeppsen 
and his wife, Jill Jeppsen, on June 11, 1983. Bother Mr. Topik 
and Mr. Jeppsen indicated that the second document was necessary 
because of the wife's signature and because they had additional 
negotiations which were included on Exhibit 21. (T.p.332, 308 
through 309) Mr. Jeppsen also testified that the first document 
was executed so that he would not lose his chance at the property 
and that the second document was necessary because there were 
more negotiations between he and Nick Topik between the 4th and 
the 11th of June. (T.p.308 through 309) Exhibits 20 and 21 are 
identical as it relates to the property and the purchase price. 
Exhibit 21 on its face was signed by the Jeppsens on June 11, 
1983. It is clear that the last prepared document between two 
parties when it is dealing with the same property would be 
controlling. At the very least, both documents would have to be 
viewed so as to accomplish the purpose of the parties as set 
forth in both documents. In this case, Nick Topik and the 
Jeppsens both understood the status of their negotiations and 
there were no difficulties that arose by reason of the two 
earnest money agreements. The transaction was completed long 
before this matter was brought to the attention of the Department 
of Business Regulations. The State has not alleged that there is 
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any statute or rule that requires that when you alter a document 
that something be placed in the second document indicating that 
the first is superseded. Consequently, the State has not 
demonstrated that Nick Topik did anything improper in executing 
Exhibits 20 and 21. 
The hearing examiner found that Nick Topik was incompetent 
because he failed to account for earnest moneys being transferred 
from one document to another. Again this issue related to 
Exhibits 20 and 21. On June 4, 1983, there was a $100.00 earnest 
money deposit made with the execution of Exhibit 20. When 
Exhibit 21 was executed it reflected that $100.00 earnest money 
had been paid. Jeppsen did not pay more than $100.00 in earnest 
money and Exhibit 21 which was executed for the purpose of 
modifying and replacing Exhibit 20 merely reflected the receipt 
of the $100.00 earnest money. The State did not allege in its 
petition that anything was improper concerning the earnest money. 
Topik was not put on notice that he needed to respond to that 
issue and yet the hearing examiner found that Topik was 
incompetent as a result thereof. There is no representation by 
the State as to what should have been done in this case nor any 
indication that any regulation indicates that what Mr. Topik did 
do was in any way improper. It should be noted that the $100.00 
earnest money was owed directly to Mr. Topik and that it was made 
out in the form of a personal check. Consequently, Mr. Topik was 
not holding it in trust for a client or customer and the check 
itself was evidence of the payment of the sum. Clearly no one 
was injured by this procedure and the only way it could have been 
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handled differently would have been to make a notation on the 
second document indicating that the first was superseded and that 
the earnest money paid on the first applied towards the second. 
Again there is no useful purpose to such a notation and certainly 
no standard that requires that it be done by a broker in order 
for him to be "competent." 
The hearing examiner found that Topik was incompetent 
because he added additional terms to an earnest money agreement 
(however innocuous). This reference apparently has to do with 
the part of the finding contained in Paragraph 31 which is set 
forth on Pages 11 and 12 where the hearing examiner makes 
reference to two copies of a May 27, 1983, earnest money 
agreement marked as Exhibits 18 and 19. The hearing exami* *r 
concludes that they are identical with the exception of a few 
additional filled in blanks on Exhibit 19- He then goes on to 
say that it appears that after Topik had Rucker sign the 
agreement he tore off a copy and left it with Rucker and took the 
remaining carbons (to which he at some point added a few 
innocuous details) to Mane for his signature. If in fact this is 
the finding referred to by the hearing examiner, then it is 
difficult to understand how he could find Topik incompetent based 
upon Exhibits 18 and 19. The only differences are contained on 
Lines 27, 28, 32, and 36. There are some notations on the face 
of Exhibit 18 at the very bottom where it says Hillam Agency per 
Nick 6/7/83 and June 15th. Those notations seem to be notations 
made by Topik for his own personal benefit which showed up when 
the document was photocopied for purposes of this hearing. The 
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information contained on Lines 27, 28, 32, and 36 are consistent 
with the balance of the contract and the agreement of the 
parties. Apparently, they were filled in because of an oversight 
prior to the time that Manes signed the document. Even the 
hearing examiner has concluded that they are "innocuous details". 
Again there is no reference by the hearing examiner and no 
allegations by the State to any rules or regulations or laws that 
have been violated by Topik. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The appellant has raised for the first time in his brief 
before this Court issues that were not raised before the District 
Court which acted as an intermediate court of appeal. Those 
issues relate to the standard of review which should be applied 
by the District Court and the deference that should be given to a 
review of the administrative law judge's decision by 
commissioners of the Department of Business Regulation. 
The appellant contends that the standards enunciated by 
Justice Oaks in Utah Department of Administrative Services v. 
Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983) should be 
applied to the decision of the Department of Business Regulation 
being reviewed by this Court. The respondent contends that those 
standards were made with specific reference to the legislative 
requirements of review set for Public Service Commission 
decisions contained in U.C.A. Section 54-7-16. That section of 
the code does not apply to a review of the decisions of the 
Department of Business Regulations. The respondent contends that 
the standard of reasonableness and rationality applies to the 
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review of a decision of the Department of Business Regulations by 
a district court judge, and that same standard applies to a 
review by the Supreme Court of the decision of the district c^urt 
judge. 
It is the position of the respondent that he was not 
permitted to appear before the commissioners of the Real Estate 
Division of the Department of Business Regulations, was not 
permitted to argue to the commissioners, and the commissioners 
were not able to view the demeanor of the witnesses or to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses that appeared before the 
administrative law judge. Consequently, no deference should be 
given to the commissioners review of the administrative law 
judge's decision and said review did not substitute for 
presenting testimony at the hearing in order to determine whether 
or not the acts of the respondent constituted incompetency. That 
the State Legislature and the Commission have not defined the 
term incompetency nor was any evidence presented at the hearing 
to demonstrate whether or not the alleged acts of the respondent 
would be considered by other professionals as being incompetent. 
Consequently, the findings of the administrative law judge that 
the respondent was incompetent in violation of U.C.A. Section 
61-2-11 (8) cannot be sustained. 
The decision of the district court judge to reverse the 
findings of the administrative law judge was reasonable and 
rational and should not be reversed by the Supreme Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
POIHT I 
THE APPELLANT FAILED TO RAISE MAHY OF THE LEGAL ISSUES 
COHTAIHED IH THIS APPEAL BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT AMD THEREFORE 
SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM ARGUIHG THEM AT THIS TIME. 
The appellantfs brief addresses for the first time the 
weight that should be given to the decision by the Department of 
Business Regulation. This is true in regard to what the 
appellant believes should be the deference paid to the Real 
Estate Commissions review of the administrative law judge1 s 
decision and to the standard of review that should be applied by 
the District Court to the decision of the administrative law 
judge or Real Estate Commission. These issued will be addressed 
by the respondent under Point II and III of its argument. 
However, it is the position of the respondent that these issues 
should have been introduced before the District Court. By 
failing to raise these issues before the District Court, the 
appellant precludes these issues from being raised for the first 
time at the Supreme Court level. The Supreme Court has 
consistently held that a party will not be heard to complain of 
irregularities in a lower Court if that party did not raise the 
issues before that Court. Utah County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83 
(Utah 1983); Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 
733 (Utah 1984); Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 (Utah 1979) 
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POINT II 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW TO BE USED BT THE DISTRICT COURT IM 
REVIEWING THE DECISION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
AND TO BE USED BT THE SUPREME COURT IN REVIEWING THE DECISION OF 
THE DISTRICT COURT IS THAT OF REASONABLENESS OR RATIONALITY. 
The appellant has requested that this Court apply a 
standard of review to the Department of Business Regulation as 
defined in the case of Utah Department of Administrative Services 
v. Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983). While 
that case may be helpful in understanding the standard of review 
to be applied to administrative agencies, it does not control the 
standard of review to be used in the case presently before the 
Cou.'t. U.C.A. Section 61-2-11 (d) provides that the District 
Court may review the decision of the Department of Business 
Regulation to determine whether, "The executive director and the 
commission have regularly pursued their authority and have not 
acted arbitrarily...." The State Legislature has not given any 
additional guidelines as to the scope and standard that a 
District Court is to apply in reviewing the decision of the 
Department of Business Regulation. In reference to the word 
"arbitrary11 and "capricious" Justice Oaks in Administrative 
Services stated as follows: "...standing alone, these words are 
subjected to the criticism that they are mere word formulas that 
give little guidance in defining the limited circumstances in 
which the reviewing court can upset the findings of the 
agency...." Justice Oaks then proceeds to define "arbitrary" and 
"capricious" in relationship to the statutory requirements for 
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the review of decisions by the Public Service Commission. The 
appellant would have the Court believe that' the standard of 
review for a decision by the Department of Business Regulation is 
that set forth in Justice Oaks1 decision requiring that the 
greatest degree of deference shall be extended to the commissions 
findings on the basic questions of fact. However, it is 
important to note that U.C.A. Section 54-7-16 (2) provides that 
the findings and conclusions of the commission on questions of 
fact shall be final and shall not be subject to review. It was 
in this contexts that Justice Oaks defined arbitrary as it 
applied to basic questions of fact. No such statutory authority 
exists in relationship to the review of the decisions of the 
Department of Business Regulation. Consequently, this definition 
of arbitrary cannot be applied to a decision of the Department of 
Business Regulations. 
It is the position of the respondent that arbitrary as 
used in relationship to the decisions of the Department of 
Business Regulation should be interpreted to mean that the 
District Court can decide whether or not the decisions of the 
Commission were reasonable or rational. This standard was 
applied by Justice Oaks in Administrative Services under a 
heading referred to as other decisions. Justice Oaks reserves 
this classification for review of the Public Service Commission 
decisions for "mixed questions of fact and law". Since the State 
Legislature has not given any definite guide lines other than the 
term "arbitrarily" to a review of the District Court of the 
Department of Business Regulations, it would seem appropriate 
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that the standard of reasonableness and rationality be applied. 
The appellant contends that the entire standard of review 
set forth in Administrative Services should be applied to 
decision by the Department of Business Regulation. The appellant 
cites the case of Board of Education of Severe County School 
District v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment 
Security, 701 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1985) as supporting that position. 
In fact, that case dealt with the standard of review to be 
applied by the Utah Supreme Court in reviewing a decision by an 
intermediate board of review or court of appeal. The Court 
stated in part as follows: 
w
...In reviewing the conclusion of the board of 
review, we apply an intermediate standard of review 
which requires that the decision under 
consideration be reasonable or rational. City of 
Orem v. Christensen, Utah, 682 P.2d 292, 293 
( 1983)• fWe will affirm the Board's decision 
unless, as a matter of law, the determination was 
wrong because only the opposite conclusion could be 
drawn from the facts1...." 
In this case the Box Elder County District Court acted as 
an intermediate Court of Appeal and, consequently, the Supreme 
Court should support its decision unless as a matter of law, the 
determination was wrong because only the opposite conclusion 
could be drawn. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT HOLING WAS REASONABLE OR RATIONAL. 
A. The term incompetent as defined is vague and 
uncertain and consequently its application in this case is 
unconstitutional in nature. 
The appellant at the hearing before the administrative law 
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judge contented that the terms unworthy or incompetent as used in 
the state statute was unconstitutionally vague. The 
administrative law judge supported the appellant1s contention as 
to the term unworthy, but denied it as to the term incompetent. 
This issue was raised again in the appeal to the District Court 
judge and Judge Call concluded: 
"This court does not accept the Divisions 
conclusions as to the application of the Vance 
interpretation to the case at bar and therefore 
rejects the findings of the ALJ of violations of 
61-2-11 (8), except and unless the broker's conduct 
also violated one or more of the other seventeen 
listed proscribed activities. As was pointed out 
in one of the Division's cited cases, competence is 
not perfection and the ALJ found much of the 
broker's conduct was either innocuous or resulted 
in no damage or injury to any person." 
It has been generally held by all Courts that a regulation 
or law is void on its face as violating the due process clause of 
the constitution when it does not reasonably notify a person of 
the act or acts prohibited. The Utah Court has specifically 
addressed the issue of whether or not a regulation under the 
Department of Business Regulation is unconstitutionally vague. 
These cases have dealt with the medical profession, but are 
applicable to the situation presently before this Court. In the 
case of Athay v. State Department of Business Regulation, Utah, 
262 P.2d 965 (1981) the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
Department had acted arbitrarily and deprived the plaintiff of 
her rights of due process when it refused to permit the plaintiff 
to take an examination for certification as a psychologist on the 
basis that her doctor's degree did not meet the statutory 
requirements of "a program of studies whose content was primarily 
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psychological, " The Court held that it was a violation of due 
process because the Department had not published uniform 
identifiable standards. It is the position of Topik that the 
Department has not set any standards or definitions that 
prescribe what unworthy or unprofessional means. Consequently, 
it would be arbitrary for a hearing examiner to make that 
determination without any guidance being provided. In the case of 
Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124 (Utah 1983) the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld the Department of Business Regulation in its revocation of 
a physicianfs license for unprofessional conduct. On Page 128 
and 129 of that decision, the Court refers to a number of cases 
which support both sides of this argument. In reference to some 
of those cases, the Court says in part as follows: 
"...In the context of the statues and hearing 
procedures in those cases, the Courts held that 
'unprofessional conduct1 can not be used to revoke 
licenses without prior rules establishing the 
standards by which the professionals would be 
judged. Neither case denied (in fact both 
apparently conceded) that the standard of 
'unprofessional conduct1 could be applied by expert 
professionals to judge another professional's 
conduct in the care of patients. This was the 
holding in Chastek." 
The Court indicated that in the case before it that the medical 
practice act gives a statutory definition of unprofessional 
conduct and that the adequacy and appropriateness of the 
definition had not been challenged in the appeal to the District 
Court. The court also observed that the plaintiff had been 
judged by his peers or other medical professionals who had 
determined that he had not followed the standards existing in the 
profession. 
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In the case before this Court there was no testimony by 
any real estate agent that pertained to the regulations or 
statutes that the hearing administrator founu Topik had violated. 
Consequently, there was no evidence by his peers that would 
indicate that the alleged violations were contrary to the 
practice within his profession. Nor was there a definition given 
in the Utah Code or in the regulations which in any way defined 
unprofessional conduct as there was in the Vance case. If a 
person has not violated any specific standard or rule promulgated 
by the State Real Estate Commission, if there is no definition 
of what constitutes unprofessional conduct, and if there is no 
evidence produced by other real estate brokers, then of necessity 
any determination that the person is unworthy or incompetent 
would have to be arbitrary since there would be no set standard 
by which such action could be judged. This could result in a 
hearing examiner allowing his own personal prejudices or biases 
to influence his determination, and that of course would be 
arbitrary and in violation of the due process clause of both the 
State and Federal constitution. 
The appellant in his brief before this Court said that the 
respondents actions were reviewed by his peers when the 
Commission reviewed the administrative law judge1s decision. 
However, it should be noted that the respondent was not given any 
opportunity to appear before the commissioners, to argue to the 
commissioners, to learn of the commissioners qualifications or 
lack thereof, or learn of their prejudices. The appellant 
contends that the commissioner's reviewed in detail the decision 
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of the administrative law judge. However, there is no way that 
the respondent can ascertain whether that representation is 
correct. In addition, the commissioners are generally not 
present at hearings and therefore cannot view the demeanor or 
make judgments as to the credibility of witness that appear 
before the administrative law judge. Consequently, the 
respondent believes that a review by the Commission does not 
afford him the type of review by his peers anticipated in the 
Vance case. 
The administrative law judge ruled against the respondent 
on Fact Situations No. 2, 4, 6, 7* and 9 on the basis that the 
respondent was incompetent. The decision on all of these fact 
situations were reversed by the District Court's f'lding in 
relationship to the application of the standard of incompetency. 
Fact Situation No. 2 was also based upon a finding that the 
respondent has exposed his client to two commissions. This issue 
will be dealt with in Section B. 
B. The determination of the administrative law judge as 
to violations of specific statutory regulations were not 
supported by the facts. 
The administrative law judge found against the respondent 
on Fact Situation No. 1 on the basis that he had violated O.C.A. 
Section 61-2-11 (9) which requires a broker to voluntarily 
furnish copies of all documents to all parties executing the 
documents. The District Court Judge found: 
"As to the first finding that the broker had failed 
to furnish copies pursuant to subsection (9) it is 
noted that the listing party by signature 
acknowledges receipt of a copy of the document, and 
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the only apparent basis for the claimed violation 
is that the broker had no recollection of handing 
the document to the party but assumes he did. As 
to amending the documents or adding thereto, the 
information added to the document was nothing more 
than property details to better help the broker in 
marketing the property and would likely not be 
known by the owner without consulting payment 
records, tax receipts, etc. None of the added 
information altered the contract between the party 
and the broker nor endangered the public.11 
The respondent contends that the facts as set out by the 
district court judge are correct and supported by the findings of 
the administrative law judge. The administrative law judge's 
conclusion that those facts constitute a violation of. (9) was 
incorrect and the District Court's decision to reverse that 
conclusion was reasonable and rational and should be upheld by 
the Supreme Court. 
In relationship to Fact Situation No. 2 the administrative 
law judge found that the respondent had violated Rule 11(g) of 
the Rules and Regulations of the Division of Real Estate which 
prohibits a real estate agent from exposing a client to two real 
estate commissions. In reviewing this fact situation, the 
district court judge stated: 
wAs to the findings that parties were subjected to 
payment of a double commission the record is clear 
that the listing was made with an owner who had 
represented that he had terminated the prior 
listing. While it is asserted and not denied that 
another broker had obtained an extension of his 
listing on the property, Topik removed his signs 
from the property and made no claim for his own 
listing upon receipt of the claimed extension." 
In this fact situation the District Court accepted the 
factual findings of the administrative law judge, but disagreed 
with the conclusion of the Judge that the facts constitute 
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exposing a client to a double commission. The decision of the 
district court judge was reasonable and rational and should not 
be over turned by the Supreme Court. 
In Fact Situation No. 3 the administrative law judge found 
that the respondent has violated Rule 11(f) of the Rules and 
Regulations of the Division of Real Estate in that he advertised 
property at a price lower than listed and without the consent of 
the seller. The district court overruled the administrative law 
judgefs decision in this fact situation without comment. It was 
obvious from the record that the respondent was authorized by his 
client to offer the property for sale at $60,000.00 with 
$5,000.00 down. This was done by a counter offer made by the 
client on July 14, 1983* which is marked as Exhibit E and by a 
letter addressed to the respondent dated August 14, 1983, which 
confirmed a phone call she previously had with the respondent 
which letter is marked as Exhibit C. The property was advertised 
at $59,800.00 with $5,000.00 down. The difference of $200.00 
between the authorized price of $60,000.00 and $59*000.00 
represented a reduction of $200.00 which the respondent intended 
to deduct from is commission thereby resulting in the client 
receiving precisely the amount of money which she anticipated. 
The conclusion by the administrative law judge that the 
respondent had violated Rule 11(f) was not reasonable or rational 
and the ruling of the district court judge in overturning that' 
decision was reasonable or rational and should be affirmed by the 
Supreme Court. 
Fact Situation No. 5 was decided in favor of the 
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i 
respondent by the administrative law judge and, consequently, was 
not a subject of appeal to the District Court or to the Supreme 
Court, Fact Situation No. 8 was dismissed by the appellate at 
the administrative hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent contends that the decision of the district 
court judge acting as an intermediate court of appeal was 
reasonable and rational and should be supported by the Supreme 
Court. The respondent contends that the findings in relationship 
to Fact Situations 1, 2, and 3 did not support the conclusions of 
the Administrative Law Judge and did not constitute a violation 
of the sections of the Utah Code referred to therein. The 
decision of the district court judge to reverse and over rule the 
the conclusions of the administrative law judge was sound and 
based upon findings that were made by the administrative law 
judge at the hearing. 
The respondent contends that the application of the term 
incompetent to Fact Situations 2, 4, 6, 7* and 9 were not 
supportable given the fact that no evidence was presented before 
the administrative law judge as to the standards to be applied to 
a real estate agent in the State of Utah and no definition was 
given by the State Legislature or by the Commission of the term 
"incompetent" which would permit the Commission to even apply the 
standard to the respondent or others appearing before an 
administrative law judge. 
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The respondent respectfully requests that the Supreme 
Court affirm the decision of the District Court Judge. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of July, 1986. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify four (4) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent was mailed, postage prepaid, this 
m day of July, 1986, to David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General, 
Stephen G. Schwendiman, Chief, Assistant Attorney, and Robert B. 
Hicks, Assistant Attorney General, at Division of Real Estate, 
130 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Respondent 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE
 ) 
TO ACT AS A REAL ESTATE BROKER ] 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH OF NICK 
TOPIK, ) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 18944 
The Broker in question appealed from the Order of the Executive 
Director of the Division and the Real Estate Commission confirming, 
approving and adopting the decision of tTe Administrative Law Judge 
(hereafter ALJ) in recommending the suspension of the broker1s license 
for a period of 150 days and a three year period of probation commenc-
ing at the termination of the suspension. 
The decision of the ALJ was based on a consideration of nine 
fact situations, some of which were found to constitute no violation 
and others found to violate U.C.A. Section 61-2-11 (9) failure to 
furnish copies of documents, Section 61-2-11 (8) subjecting a client 
to double commissions and advertising property lower than the listing 
price without written consent, Section 61-2-11 (8) offering to pay 
a finders fee to an unlicensed person, Section 62-2-11 (8) amending 
an offer without obtaining indication of consent of buyers, Section 
61-2-11 (8) approximating as the 'balance due1 on a listing as 
"approximately $37,000.00" when the actual balance was $37,950.00, 
and 61-2-11 (8) preparing multiple documents, listing and/or earnest 
money offers without indicating which ones were binding and by addinc -
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Section 61-2-11 provides in relevant part that: 
"the commission - may suspend, revoke, place on probation, 
or deny re-issuance of any license issued under this chapter 
at any time if the licensee 
- in performing or attempting to perform any of the acts 
specified in this chapter is found guilty of: (8) being 
unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal broker, 
associate broker, or sales agent in such manner as to safe-
guard the interests of the public; 
(9) failing to voluntarily furnish copies of all documents 
to all parties executing the documents." 
Appellant argues that 61-2-11 (8) is vague and uncertain and 
affords no standard by which a party can be judged citing principally 
two Utah Cases, Athay vs. State Department of Business Regulation 
626 P2, 965, and Vance vs. Fordham 671 P2, 124. The Commission relies 
also on the Vance vs. Fordham Case wherein the court held that 
"unprofessional conduct" in a medical doctor licensing case was an 
adequate statutory standard and arguing therefore "being unworthy \/ 
or incompetent" in a real estate broker's case is likewise an adequate 
statutory standard. Commission counsel noted that in the Vance case 
the referred to standards of performance would be interpreted 
by members of the profession in the process of administrative 
adjudication and equates that to other brokers filing the charges 
herein, even though no other brokers appeared and testified at the 
hearing before the ALJ. To be specific the Division argues in the 
first full paragraph on Page 9, 
" Applying the foregoing principle of lav; to this case, 
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yields but one conclusion: Mr. Topik's license suspension 
was considered by a group of his peers who decided he was 
"unworthy or incompetent to act a a principal broker . . . 
in such a manner as to safeguard the interest of the public. 
Such was the decision considered and made by Mr. Topik!s 
peers and therefore satisfies the requirements of Vance." 
This court does not accept the Divisions conclusions as to 
the application of the Vance interpretation to the case at bar and 
therefore rejects the findings of the ALJ of violations of 61-2-11 (8) , 
except and unless the broker's conduct also violated one or more of 
the other seventeen listed proscribed activities. As was pointed out 
in one of the Division's cited cases, competence is not perfection 
and the ALJ found much of the broker1 s conduct was pithpr -jrmnrnnnc; 
or resulted in no damage or injury to' any person. 
As to the first finding that the broker had failed to furnish 
copies pursuant to subsection (9) it is noted that the listing party 
by signature acknowledges receipt of a copy of the document, and the 
only apparent basis for the claimed violation is that the broker had 
no recollection of handing the document to the party but assumes he 
did. As to amending the documents or adding thereto, the information 
added to the document was nothing more than property details to better 
help the broker in marketing the property and would likely not be known 
by the owner without consulting payment records, tax receipts, etc. 
None of the added information altered the contract between the party 
and the broker nor- endangered the public. 
As to the finding that parties were subjected to payment of a 
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double commission the record is clear that the listing was made with 
an owner who had represented that he had terminated the prior listing. 
While it is asserted and not denied that another broker had obtained 
an extension of his listing on the property, Topik removed his signs 
from the property and made no claim for his own listing upon receipt 
of the claimed extension. 
As to the ALJfs finding of violation of 61-2-11 (8) by offering 
to pay a finder's fee to an unlicensed person, it would appear that 
if such were the case the broker had violated subsection 61-2-11 (7) , 
that is: 
" - performing or attempting to perform any act specified -
(7) paying valuable consideration as defined by the commission, 
to any person not licensed under this chapter, - ". 
Exhibit No. 12 is an advertisement run by the broker proclaiming that 
any person to whom the broker sells property or refers persons to 
whom property is sold would be elibible for a $100.00 gift certificate. 
The record is silent as to why this conduct did not amount to at least 
an attempt to pay valuable consideration to persons not licensed under 
the chapter, but the record is devoid of any further reference or 
indication why such was not found. 
Accordingly the order of the Executive Director and Commission 
is reversed, each party to pay their own litigation expenses. 
Dated this / ,3 L w day of January, 1986. 
BY THE CQURT: 
/ . 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision mailed this 15th 
day of January, 1986, to Robert A. Echard, Attorney for Respondent, 
427 27th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401 and to Robert B. Hicks, Assistant 
Attorney General, Tax & Business Regulation Division, 130 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
Jay R. Hirschi 
Box Elder County Clerk 
B y > > if.-.../ <• • y : > L . ^ 
v Deputy <y 
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BEFORE THE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the License of 
NICK TOPIK 
to Act as a Real Estate Broker 
in the State of Utah 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
No. RE-83-05-17 " 
Appearances: 
Nicholas Hales for the Real Estate Commission 
Richard Echard for the Respondent 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
Pursuant to notice duly served by certified mail, this matter came on 
regularly for hearing on August 27 and 28, 1984, before Kent Walgren, 
Administrative Law Judge for the Utah Department of Business Regulation. 
A Pre-Hearing Conference was convened on March 8, 1984 and a Pre-Hearing 
Order issued August 14, 1984. On August 27, 1984 the parties agreed to 
the following amendments in the Pre-Hearing Order: (1) Delete the last 
sentence of paragraph 9; (2) Delete the penultimate sentence of 
paragraph 10; (3) Delete the last sentence of paragraph 14. The 
Pre-Hearing Order is so amended. The Division moved to dismiss without 
prejudice Fact Situation #8 and the Counts relating thereto, which motion 
was granted; in the event it is not re-filed before October 11, 1984, it 
shall automatiically be dismissed with prejudice. 
Evidence was offered and received and the Administrative Law Judge, 
having been fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the 
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following recommended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent is, and at all times relevant to these proceedings has 
been, a licensee of the Real Estate Division of the State of Utah. 
Tact Situation #1 
2. Rosalie Tsosie, as owner of certain real property located at 30 
Vest 700 North in Brigham City, Utah, listed her property with C-21 
Mountain Aire Realty, Inc. of Brigham City. The listing began May 5, 
1982 with a term of six months. Sometime in or about the latter part of 
October, 1982, Ms. •Tsosie extended the listing to January 5, 1983. 
Although notice of the extension of the listing appeared in the October 
29, 1982, "Rot Sheet" of the Brigham-Tremonton Association of Realtors, 
of which Respondent is a member, we find that Respondent was unaware of 
the extension. \ 
3. The initial listing would have expired November 5, 1982. On 
November 5 or 6, Respondent visited Ms. Tsosie about obtaining the 
listing for Western Kills Realty. Being unsophisticated in real property 
transactions, Ms. Tsosie did not understand that she was subjecting 
herself to a double commission; Respondent apparently did not ask if the 
prior listing had been extended. 
4. On the listing form, using a blue-ink pen, Respondent filled in 
the asking price, the listing date and expiration date, the construction 
material of the house ("brick") and noted that "People from Florida are 
exempt." Then Respondent completed the bottom of the form (see Division 
Exhibit 5) and had Ms. Tsosie sign listing and sign again that she had 
received a copy of it. Respondent then placed a sign for Western Hills 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-4-
Gonzales apparently believed he had authority to unilaterally terminate 
the listing and that the telephone call accomplished same. No written 
release was requested or obtained. Vardley considered the listing valid 
at all times. 
9. On July 31, 1982 Topik approached Gonzales about listing the 
property. Gonzales told Respondent: "If you want to, go ahead." 
Thereupon, Respondent had Gonzales execute a two month listing with 
Western Hills. Respondent knew the property had been listed with Wardley 
but accepted Gonzales' verbal assertion that he had terminated the 
listing. Respondent made no attempt to contact either Wardley or the MLS 
to ascertain whether or not the listing was still valid. 
10. Respondent knew, or should have known, that one party to a 
written listing agreement cannot unilaterally terminate the agreement on 
a whim. Respondent also knew, or should have known (by reviewing the MLS 
book), that Wardley's listing did not expire until September 28, 1982. 
Under the circumstances, Respondent had a duty to make reasonable 
inquiries to assure that the Wardley listing was no longer in effect. By 
violating this duty, he subjected Gonzales to liability for paying two 
commissions. Respondent's failure to inquire also constitutes 
incompetence. 
Fact Situation 33 
11. Joan Stevens listed with Topik her property located at 672 North 
100 West, Brigham City, Utah, for $65,500. On account of a VA appraisal 
(and by written agreement), the listing price was subsequently reduced to 
$64,100. The VA appraisal was contingent upon the completion of certain 
repairs which Mr. Topik ascertained would cost $10,593.20 (see 
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without the written consent of the seller, Respondent violated Section 
11. f. of the Rules and Regulations of Division.
 ( 
15. The Division alleges that Respondent substantially 
misrepresented the terms of purchase by advertising that no down payment 
was required. Although the advertisement stated "X000.00 minimum down", 
we find that it was a typographical error (should have been "5000.00 
minimum down") caused by inadvertently touching the shift key when typing 
the number 5. Since the error was caused by sloppiness rather than being 
intentional, we find no violation of Section 61-2-11(1). 
16. The Division's allegation that Respondent obtained keys without 
permission and entered Hs. Stevens' units without prior appointments was 
unsubstantiated by the evidence. We find no violation of Section 
61-2-11(8). 
Fact Situation #4 
17. Topik, as principal broker of Western Hills Realty, had 
promotional flyers printed and distributed bearing the name, address, and 
telephone number of his brokerage and offering to give a $100.00 gift 
certificate to any person "when we list and sell your home or. one 
referred by you" (emphasis added). The Division alleges that such is a 
violation of Section 61-2-11(15), in that Respondent willfully and 
deliberately 
encouraged unlicensed persons to violate the provisions of Utah Real 
Estate Licensing'Law by referring prospects to Topik in the 
expectation of receiving valuable consideration and thereby 
subjecting them to possible criminal prosecution.** (Amended Petition, 
paragraph 53) 
Respondent was never requested by the Division to cease distribution of 
the leaflets and there is no other evidence on the record indicating that 
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have been more explicit, we cannot find that the January 18, 1983, 
Earnest Money agreement, the only one presented to the sellers, is so 
defective as to demonstrate incompetence within the meaning of Section 
61-2-11(8). 
Fact Situation #6 
21- Topik prepared an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
dated February 10, 1983 on a property located at 1099 Oat, Brigham City. 
The purchasers were Donald and Eleanor Speers. The total purchase price 
was shown as $49,000 with a $50. earnest money. The balance of the terms 
of purchase were swelled out in the body of the offer. Vhen Topik 
presented the Earnest Money Offer to the listing broker, Ed Tugaw, Mr. 
Tugaw noted that there were some possible deficiencies in the terms. 
Topik took the signed offer from Mr. Tugaw and wrote in on line 24 and 25 
"Buyer will apply for a General Electric Loan. Seller to pay 3 1/2 
points.f< On lines 28 and 29 of the form there were two blank spaces 
which had not been filled in, which Topik then filled in with the terms 
pertinent to the interest rate and date of closing. Topik then handed 
the document back to Mr. Tugaw and requested that he present the document 
to the seller without returning to the prospective buyers to have them 
initial the additions. The offer was countered by the seller; when the 
buyers accepted the counter-offer they were also accepting Respondent's 
changes. 
22. In amending the offer without obtaining some indication of 
consent from the buyers, Respondent demonstrated incompetence within the 
meaning of Section 61-2-11(8). In mitigation, the buyers ratified the 
additions on the same day and no one was injured. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
< 
-10-
t least two other real property transactions since this one) agreed 
erbally to purchase the home as follows: Total purchase price: < 
•45,800; Terms: Mayne to pay $30,000 cash ($5000 down and $25,000 at 
closing) and assume an existing mortgage in the amount of approximately 
£15,800. The parties agreed to close on or about June 15, 1983, at which < 
time Hayne would have available the cash necessary to close the sale. In 
early hay, 1983, Hayne gave Rucker the $5,000 down payment, thereby 
obtaining an equitable interest in the property; no written documents 
were executed. Rucker knew that she was selling the home considerably 
below market value;- she needed to move and, as she explained to Hayne, 
the home needed a new roof. 
28. Mayne initially considered occupying.the*home but his wife 
decided it was too far from church and shopping facilities so in early 
Hay, 1983 Hayne decided to contact his friend and fishing buddy of ten 
years, Kick Topik. The first few times Hayne went by Respondent*s 
office, he was out. The agents who were there encouraged Hayne to list 
the property but he said he wanted to sell it, not list it (he didn't 
want to pay the im» sales commission). About mid-Hay, Hayne met with 
Topik at the latter's office. Hayne told Topik he had purchased the 
Rucker home, and that he wanted to turn it over for a $3000 profit (there 
is a dispute here: Topik testified at the hearing that he agreed to pay 
Hayne $2500 profit), and that he would sell it to Topik for $49,500. 
Mayne did not tell Topik about the $5000 he had already paid to Rucker. 
29. On Hay 24, 1983, Hayne and Topik signed an Earnest Honey Receipt 
and Offer to Purchase with the following terms: Total Purchase Price: 
$49,500; Earnest Honey: $500; Payment when Hayne accepts sale: $4500; 
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(The record is not clear whether Mayne retained Topik*s $500 earnest 
money noted in the May 24 Earnest Money agreement; did this, added to the 
$2500, constitute Mayne's $3000 profit? The closing statements are 
silent about the $500.) There are two copies of the May 27, 1983 Earnest 
Money agreement (Division Exhibits 18 and 19), both of which are 
identical with the exception of a few additional filled-in blanks on 
Exhibit 19. It appears that after Topik had Rucker sign the agreement he 
tore off a copy and left it with Rucker (Exhibit 18) and took the 
remaining carbons (to which he at some point added a few inocuous 
details) to Mayne for his signature. Although the purchase prices in the 
May 24 and May 27 Earnest Money agreements are identical, the terms 
differ. In the May 27 agreement, Topik notes having paid $560 earnest 
money to Rucker (which does appear on the closing statements), the 
$15,800 assumption, and the balance of $33,140 to be paid as follows: 
(a) $25,600 by a loan from Mayne to Topik ($200/month, payments at 
9*—the loan from Mayne to Topik is substantially identical to the May 24 
agreement); and (b) the remaining $7,540 presumably to be paid in cash at 
closing by Topik. The mystery of the May 27 Earnest Money agreement is 
how the figure of $560 (earnest money to Rucker) was arrived at. There 
is some evidence that Mayne also paid Rucker $650 for some items of 
personal property that eventually went with the house; perhaps that 
figure is somehow related to the personal property. No one who testified 
at the hearing, Topik included, was able to recall all the details and 
the documents are less than ideal, never mentioning whether one document 
supersedes another, never mentioning transfers of earnest monies. The 
May 27 Earnest Money agreement does state that Topik is a licensed Real 
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ransaction on the day of closing. Subsequently, however, Hayne's 
nildren discovered that Hayne had invested $25,600 at 9* interest over 
6 years and cried foul. * 
34. We are not convinced that the Division's tendency to portray 
.ayne as a naive elderly gentleman who was duped by the Respondent is 
rholly accurate. Hayne can still read without the help of glas-ses. 
:hose who know Hayne testified they respect his shrewdness as a 
'horse-trader.** We are inclined to believe Topik when he said he made it 
:lear that this was a private, arms-length deal. We are convinced that 
rtayne knew he was leaning money to Topik—perhaps not exactly for 36 
years, but for enough years that Hayne knew he wouldn't be around to 
collect it. Thus we find no substantial misrepresentation as alleged by 
the Division in Count 10, no false promises as alleged in Count 13, and 
no dishonest dealing as alleged in Count 15. hayne seems to have been 
content with the transaction until his children objected and until he 
discovered the price for which Topik had resold the home. 
35. Inasmuch as Hayne obtained an equitable interest in the property 
when he paid $5000 to Rucker, Hayne's $2500 profit, however denominated, 
was not technically a finder's fee. Even though there were no written 
documents between Rucker and Hayne, Hayne's partial performance on their 
verbal agreement may well have made the agreement enforceable in equity 
despite the Statute of Frauds. We thus can find no violation under Count 
6 of the Petition. 
36. We do find that Respondent's preparation of multiple documents 
with no indication of which was to be binding, his failure to account for 
earnest monies being transfered from one document to another, and his 
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th em, altering documents after they had been executed, offering to sell 
property below the listed price, offering to pay illegal finders* fees, 
preparing ambiguous documents and duplicate documents with no indication 
of which supersedes which and failing to account for the transfer of 
earnest monies from one document to another cannot be condoned. We are 
not convinced that Mr. Topik is dishonest; we are not convinced that Mr. 
Topik lacks the ability—if he took the time—to structure a competent 
real estate transaction. We are convinced that in 31 years of wheeling 
and dealing Respondent has developed a habit of cutting corners to the 
extent that he posers a threat to the public health, safety and welfare. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Real Estate Broker's License of 
NICK TOPIK be, and the same hereby is, suspended for a period of 150 days; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent's Real Estate Broker's License 
be, and the same hereby is, placed on probation for a period of three (3) 
years, said probation to commence at the termination of the 
aforementioned suspension. 
In the event Respondent further violates any statute or rule 
governing the conduct of Real Estate Brokers in the State of Utah during 
any period of suspension or probation, he shall be ordered to appear and 
show cause why his License to Act as a Broker in the State of Utah should 
not be revoked. 
DATED this 31st day of August, 1984. 
fajtiVfrL, *' — 
KENT WALGREN, Administrative Law Judge 
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